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85 of the Basic Law, which says that the 
“courts of the Hong Kong Special Adminis-
trative Region shall exercise judicial power 
independently, free from any interference. 
Members of the judiciary shall be immune 
from legal action in the performance of 
their judicial functions”. 
To preserve Hong Kong’s judicial inde-
pendence, the Basic Law has provided an 
array of protections, including the tenure of
judges. However, that does not mean the 
judiciary has the right to reject reasonable 
curbs imposed on it by others.
The composition of the judiciary is not a
matter to be determined by the judiciary on
its own. The chief executive’s power to 
appoint judges makes this clear.
More importantly, although the Basic
Law has vested Hong Kong with the power 
of final adjudication, its judiciary is still no 
more than a local judiciary, and both the 
scope of its jurisdiction over cases and 
power to interpret the Basic Law are 
explicitly restrained by the Basic Law. 
In accordance with Article 19 of the
Basic Law, the courts of the SAR shall have 
no jurisdiction over acts of state such as 
defence and foreign affairs. Also, under 
Article 158, the power of interpretation of 
the Basic Law shall be vested in the NPC 
Standing Committee, whose decisions are 
binding on the Hong Kong courts. 
In conclusion, Li and others who agree
with him have made these arguments 
because they failed to accurately under-
stand that the constitutional order in “one 
country, two systems” is based on both the 
Constitution and the Basic Law. For the one
country, two systems to continue, a pre-
condition is to understand Hong Kong’s 
constitutional order and its basis.
For this purpose, it is necessary to close-
ly study the Basic Law and the Constitution.
Every person who intends to make Hong 
Kong home should understand the 
relationship between the Constitution and 
the Basic Law, and between the central 
government and the SAR. This is especially 
true of those who hold public office or 
important positions in society. I hope Li 
and those who agree with him could make 
some headway in this direction.
Xu Ze is president of the Chinese Association of 
Hong Kong and Macau Studies. He was formerly 
a deputy director of Beijing’s Hong Kong and 
Macau Affairs Office
F
ormer chief justice Andrew Li
Kwok-nang recently voiced his
opinions on the enactment of the
Hong Kong national security law
by the Standing Committee of the
National People’s Congress. He argued, 
inter alia, that the chief executive’s power to
select the judges who would deal with 
national security cases would be detrimen-
tal to the city’s judicial independence. To 
address an accusation that involves a 
breach of the Hong Kong Basic Law, we 
have to respond in line with that law.
Li establishes his arguments on three
grounds. First, the judiciary is independent 
from the executive, thus has the power to 
determine which judges shall deal with 
national security cases. Second, the chief 
executive lacks experience and expertise in 
the selection of judges. Third, it is improper
for the chief executive, as chairwoman of 
the Committee for Safeguarding National 
Security, to select judges on her own. 
These three grounds may look sensible
to a certain degree, but are they compatible
with the political order laid down by the 
Basic Law? The answer is no, for the follow-
ing reasons: First, the political system laid 
down by the Basic Law is one of executive 
dominance, rather than based on the 
principle of separation of powers.
In accordance with Articles 43 and 48,
the chief executive is the head of both the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
and its government at the same time, that 
is, she has dual capacities, and therefore is 
accountable to the central government and
the SAR at the same time. One of her prime 
duties is to implement the Basic Law and all
other laws applicable to the SAR as adopted
by the Basic Law, which, needless to say, 
shall include those set out in Annex III.
Chapter IV of the Basic Law, which sets
out the SAR’s political system, has six 
sections. Section 1 is devoted to the roles 
and duties of the chief executive, while the 
next three sections set out the same for the 
executive authorities, legislature and the 
judiciary. This shows the chief executive is 
at the core of the SAR’s power structure. 
According to the articles in this chapter,
the chief executive is the only person who is
accountable to the central government on 
behalf of the SAR. For this reason, the chief 
executive was granted an array of powers by
the Basic Law. 
The chief executive is not only the head
of the executive, but also the head of the 
SAR. The powers vested in her include that 
of the appointment of judges. Why would Li
think such an arrangement is tantamount 
to executive interference with the judiciary?
It is because he has established Hong Kong 
courts’ constitutional jurisdiction through 
case precedents – in other words, the power
to conduct a judicial review – thereby creat-
ing the semblance of “judicial supremacy”. 
These persistent misunderstandings of
the SAR’s political system are a key reason 
Hong Kong’s executive-dominant political 
system has been mistakenly believed to be 
based on the separation of powers. 
The separation of powers is not within
the institutional design of the Basic Law. 
The Basic Law is determined by the unitary 
nature of our state. As early as in 1987, Deng
Xiaoping explicitly stated that Hong Kong’s 
system would not follow a Western temp-
late; it would not be based on the separation
of powers. This is the fundamental 
principle for designing the SAR’s political 
system, and also a crucial legislative intent.
Second, to appoint judges is an essential
power of the chief executive vested by the 
Basic Law. Article 48(6) provides that the 
chief executive shall appoint judges of the 
courts at all levels. This provision is so clear 
and concise that no one could misunder-
stand it. Also, Article 88 provides that the 
judges shall be appointed by the chief 
executive on the recommendation of an 
independent commission composed of lo-
cal judges, people from the legal profession 
and eminent people from other sectors. 
Based on these two articles, we may
conclude that firstly, the power to appoint –
or not to appoint – certain judges rests with 
the chief executive. This power is substan-
tive rather than procedural. 
Secondly, the independent commis-
sion as set out in Article 88 has a right of 
nomination, and the chief executive shall 
make the appointment based on its nomi-
nations. However, the right of recommen-
dation should not be interpreted as the 
power to appoint, as the chief executive 
may reject the recommendation.
From this, one can see that the provi-
sions in the national security law empower-
ing the chief executive to appoint judges to 
deal with national security cases, in consul-
tation with the Committee for Safeguard-
ing National Security and the chief justice, 
are consistent with the Basic Law. When 
selecting judges to handle national security 
cases, the chief executive will choose from 
the pool of judges already appointed in 
accordance with the Basic Law, so there is 
no issue of other judges being appointed.
The Committee for Safeguarding
National Security is an institution responsi-
ble for safeguarding national security in the
SAR, supervised by, and accountable to, the
central government. It is perfectly reason-
able for the chief executive to consult the 
committee before selecting judges. 
Besides, the chief executive is also required 
to consult the chief justice, which further 
reflects the legislative intent of the law to 
respect and preserve the SAR’s judicial 
system. Therefore, Li can rest assured. 
Li also believes that it is improper for the
chief executive, as chair of the Committee 
for Safeguarding National Security, to 
select judges. We note that the US president
chairs the US National Security Council, 
and this does not affect his power to 
nominate and appoint US federal judges. 
Here we also need to clarify that the chief 
executive does not select judges for specific 
cases. Which judge would handle a specific 
case is a decision to be made by the judicia-
ry following the relevant procedures. 
Third, Hong Kong’s judicial indepen-
dence should not be interpreted arbitrarily.
As a legal concept, judicial independence 
has strict connotations and implications. In
Hong Kong, it is mainly reflected in Article 
Xu Ze says the chief executive’s power to pick judges for cases does not undermine judiciary
A dominant role
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determined by the 
judiciary on its own
Foreign Minister Ine Eriksen Soreide’s 
remarks to the Leangkollen Security 
Conference in February. Her speech was 
titled, “The China Challenge: Remaking 
the Landscape of Transatlantic Security.”
She said: “We should not overestimate
China’s influence on transatlantic 
cohesion. But nor should we 
underestimate its impact on international 
peace and security. Power shifts bring both 
opportunities and challenges … In line 
with its size and power, China will seek to 
shape international norms and institutions 
in its image, just as other great powers have 
done before it.”
She added: “Inevitably, there will be 
competition, disagreement and also the 
potential for conflicts. But I firmly believe 
that vigilance and engagement within the 
framework of a strong multilateral system 
is the answer. Containment, confrontation 
and decoupling are not.”
If the West can be guided by this kind of
spirit and mindset, Westlessness will be a 
false consciousness and there will be no 
need to feel restless. 
Professor Li Xing is director of the Research 
Centre on Development and International 
Relations, Department of Politics and Society, at 
Aalborg University, Denmark 
These beliefs assume several presumed
causal relationships in which economic 
modernisation leads a country into stages 
of secularisation, a plural society, political 
competition and electoral democracy. US 
ruling elites have never really made any 
effort to study how the Chinese political 
system is constructed and how political 
meritocracy, party-state dual leadership 
and more, actually function. 
The Chinese system has a certain 
resilience after decades of learning and 
modifying. It is historically shaped and 
culturally unique, and is not meant to 
replace the Western model of liberal and 
electoral democracy. We should neither 
romanticise nor demonise the Chinese 
model. China’s success does not have 
universal relevance, but it shows that non-
Western alternatives to development and 
modernisation do exist. Indeed, the 
Chinese model is a tempting option for 
many developing countries. 
Does Westlessness also imply 
restlessness? Restlessness, here, refers to a 
sentiment of deep disappointment over 
the loss of a “West-like” China. It can also 
be called the “China syndrome”, 
characterised as a mixture of psychological 
anxiety and emphatic demonisation.
In recent decades, either fascination or
irritation with China has influenced 
Western scholarship and journalism. Will 
China be a destructive or constructive 
world power? A status quo or a revisionist 
one? A force for continuity or change?
China has long been a source of 
fascination and opportunity. Those in the 
West must learn to deal with China’s rise 
outside the frameworks with which they 
are familiar and comfortable. How will the 
West meet the challenges ahead? Much of 
the answer can be found in Norwegian 
Time magazine’s cover on November13, 2017 stated in both Chinese andEnglish, “China Won”. Ian Bremmer
wrote in the cover story that, “As recently 
as five years ago, there was consensus that 
China would one day need fundamental 
political reform for the state to maintain its 
legitimacy and that China could not 
sustain its state capitalist system. Today 
China’s political and economic system is 
better equipped and perhaps even more 
sustainable than the American model.”
In February, the 56th Munich Security
Conference took place with a peculiar 
topic – “Westlessness”. It suggested a crisis 
of identity and existence in Western 
countries and a sense of uncertainty about 
the extent of the West’s global relevance in 
the age of a rising China.
While the world witnesses China-US
conflicts across a range of domains, 
America’s fear of China’s economic 
competitiveness and technological 
advance is not the essence of the problem. 
Rather, it lies in the fact the outcome of 
China’s economic success and 
modernisation does not conform to a set of 
beliefs in the West. 
Li Xing says we should neither romanticise nor demonise the Chinese model of governance
West must learn to deal with China’s rise as world power
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China and Australia are very different nations.Normally, we put our differences aside becauseof the overwhelming economic benefits, but
now we are at a stalemate. China’s investment in 
Australia has dropped 60 per cent.
Recent reports of cyberattacks and political 
interference in Australia have exacerbated anti-China 
sentiment, feelings that were already soured by 
Covid-19, barley tariffs and the politics of Hong Kong.
In China, public opinion towards Australia has also
turned negative. Australia’s call for an investigation 
into the origins of Covid-19 was poorly received. It 
reinforced a view of Australia as a US lackey.
China’s economy is reopening, and there are 
serious challenges for those of us seeking to reignite 
China-Australia trade. At the Australian Chamber of 
Commerce in West China, the situation is difficult and 
complex. We are trying to get back to business, but 
statements at senior levels continue to inflame 
tensions and strain the relationship.
How can we sustain strong economic ties in a tense
political climate? Australia can look to Japan as an 
example. Despite historical and territorial grievances, 
Japan has managed to balance its economic relations 
with China and its strategic ties to the United States.
Japan provided significant aid to China at the outset
of the pandemic, including protective equipment. This 
was warmly welcomed by the Chinese people.
Diplomatic signals of goodwill can slowly begin to
shift the popular narrative within China. This narrative 
is especially important for a country like Australia. 
Many of our exports to China are fuelled by 
discretionary purchases, including tourism, education 
and food products. A positive view of Australia among 
the Chinese people supports our export industries. 
This doesn’t mean we need to compromise our 
values. We won’t agree on human rights. We won’t 
agree on Hong Kong or the South China Sea. We can 
build areas of cooperation with China, though. We can 
work together on climate change, trade and disaster 
management.
Australia’s competitive strength is its clean, natural
environment, its high-quality education system and its 
exceptional quality of life. These assets are attractive in 
China. They are a soft form of power that can be the 
basis of deeper engagement with the Chinese people.
A recent Global Times survey ranked Australia as 
the most desirable study destination for Chinese 
students. Last year, more than 200,000 Chinese 
students studied in Australia. This represents a unique 
opportunity to shape the ideas of the Chinese middle 
class. Students who come to Australia can return home 
with new ideas and a totally different world view.
Australia’s influence depends on the relationships
these students form with us locals. Relationships at the 
individual level help us grasp the nuance and realities 
of life in our respective nations. They also help us 
recognise our own preconceptions.
At the macro level, China looks like an expansive 
new superpower, but viewed only through this 
perspective minimises the lived experience of most 
mainlanders: people who work long hours in difficult 
jobs, live in cramped and polluted environments away 
from their families.
If we really want to change the narrative, we must
showcase the egalitarian values at the heart of the 
Australian character. Once it is safe to do so, Australia 
could extend its proposed travel bubble beyond New 
Zealand to also encompass China. This would send a 
signal that Australia wants to move past this tense 
period towards better relations.
More urgently, China is bracing for further 
widespread and severe flooding. Australia has 
developed significant expertise in flood management 
through its experience of the 2011 Queensland floods. 
Offering support and equipment will be interpreted as 
a gesture of kindness and a signal that the worst of the 
relationship is behind us. It is also the right thing to do.
Decades of engagement have seen our two nations
prosper. Australia should take the lead and seek 
opportunities to re-engage, both to deepen its 
influence and safeguard its economic future.
Kyri Theos is general manager at the Australian Chamber of 
Commerce in West China
Kyri Theos says Canberra can forge 
areas of cooperation with Beijing and 
work together on issues such as trade 
and climate change, and at the same 
time showcase the country’s values
Australia should 
try to rebuild its 
China relations 
Australian beef on sale at a Beijing supermarket. Trade 
has been hit by rising political tensions. Photo: AFP
Students who come to 
Australia can return home 
with new ideas and a totally 
different world view
